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I present a model of vertical product differentiation and exit where a domestic and a foreign 
firm face fixed setup costs and quality-dependent costs of production and compete in quality 
and price in the domestic market.  Quality-dependent costs are quadratic in qualities, but 
independent of the quantities produced. The domestic government may impose a minimum 
quality standard binding for both foreign and domestic firms. In the presence of an initial 
cost advantage of the domestic firm, a sufficiently high minimum quality standard set by the 
domestic government will enable the domestic firm to induce exit of the foreign firm, i.e. to 
engage in predation. However, the same standard would lead to predation by the foreign 
firm, if the foreign firm had the initial cost advantage! 
 
JEL classification: F12, F13, L13 
Keywords: vertical product differentiation, oligopoly, trade, quality, country asymmetries 
 
1. Introduction 
This note presents a case where a minimum quality standard facilitates predation, i.e. the 
domestic firm is enabled to force exit of the foreign firm. For this case, I use a benchmark 
model of vertical product differentiation that has been extensively applied in the literature. 
One domestic and one foreign firm face quality-dependent product development costs and 
constant marginal production costs. They compete in quality and price in a single domestic 
market. Demand is such that an uncovered market results for all possible outcomes. Since 
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increased differentiation in terms of quality decreases competition between rival products, 
higher quality products will coexist with lower quality products, even if both firms were 
identical. However, in the presence of technological differences, it is possible that high-
quality products will be provided by the national industry with high costs. This results in 
inefficient production, since costs are increasing and convex in quality. 
The basic features of the model utilized here have been well-known for some time. 
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) developed a framework for quality preferences where 
consumers with identical tastes but different income levels demand different quality levels. 
They analyzed the Cournot-duopoly equilibrium and showed its dependence on the income 
distribution and quality parameters. Shaked and Sutton (1982) showed that in the case of 
duopolists that first choose quality and then compete in price, the equilibrium will include 
both firms entering with distinct quality levels enjoying positive profits, i.e., they 
demonstrated how quality differences relax price competition. Ronnen (1991) uses Shaked 
and Sutton’s framework to demonstrate cases where quality standards improve welfare. He 
concludes that there exists a binding minimum quality standard such that all consumers are 
weakly better off, both firms have positive profits, and total welfare is increased. Our model is 
based on the framework of Shaked/Sutton and Ronnen.
1 As in Ronnen, the effects of quality 
standards on industry competition are primarily driven by their influence on price competition 
and the qualities produced. Due to the duopoly situation and the nature of price and quality 
competition, an unregulated equilibrium results in qualities being too low, prices being too 
high and quality differentiation being too low when compared to a welfare-maximizing 
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solution. When qualities produced become more similar, price competition intensifies. In 
response to a quality standard that is binding for the low-quality producer, qualities rise, 
quality differentiation is reduced, and prices adjusted for quality fall. High quality rises also 
because qualities are strategic complements due to the effect of quality differentiation on price 
competition. Reduced quality differentiation results because increasing quality is increasingly 
costly. With a high standard, profits of both firms are reduced or one firm is forced out of the 
market.
2 
In the case presented, a more efficient domestic firm and a less efficient foreign firm operate 
in a single domestic market. The foreign firm initially produces and sells a product of higher 
quality. This initial situation could be the outcome of the foreign firm being longer in the 
market than the domestic firm, so that the foreign firm operated as a Stackelberg-leader 
towards the domestic firm in the past. Since the domestic firm could make monopoly profits if 
it was alone in the market, there is an incentive for the domestic government to facilitate this 
outcome by some policy. In the absence of a facilitating policy (or a prohibitive entry cost), 
however, the domestic firm cannot credibly prevent entry or effect exit of the foreign firm, 
since the current outcome represents a Nash-equilibrium. We show that the domestic 
government can choose a standard such that the domestic firm: (1) cannot have nonnegative 
profits as the low-quality firm; and (2) can set a quality such that the foreign firm cannot have 
nonnegative profits as either the low-quality or the high-quality firm; and (3) domestic 
welfare is increased. Hence, the standard facilitates predation by the domestic firm, i.e. 
forcing exit of the foreign competitor.
3 
 
                                                           
2 Related research on entry/exit has been forwarded, e.g., by Hung/Schmitt (1988), Donnenfeld/Weber (1995, 
1992), Lutz (1997), and Siebert (2003). 
3 This could also be interpreted as a quality reversal induced by the standard. Quality reversals in a vertical 
product differentiation framework have been previously addressed by Herguera/Kujal/Petrakis (1995, 2001), 
Motta/Thisse/Cabrales (1997), and Herguera/Lutz (1996, 1998, 2002).    4 
2. The Model 
There are two firms, the domestic firm d and the foreign firm f, both competing in the 
domestic market. If both firms remain in the market, then they produce distinct goods, sold at 
prices pd and pf, respectively. The two products carry a single quality attribute denoted by sd 
and sf, respectively. Either firm faces production costs that are increasing, convex (quadratic) 
functions of quality, the exact level of which depending on quality chosen and a quality cost 
parameter b. Total costs of firm i are then: 
 c i = bi si2 (1) 
In the domestic market, there is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly over the 
interval [0, T] with unit density. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of either firm d's 
product or firm f's product. The higher a consumer's income parameter t, the higher is her 
(his) reservation price. Consumer t's utility is given by equation (2) if good i is purchased.
4 
Consumers who do not purchase receive zero utility. 
 u t = si t - pi (2) 
Firms d and f play a two-stage game
5. In the first stage, firms determine qualities to be 
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5In this formulation, firm i not entering the market is equivalent to  firm i choosing si = 0.  The entry decision by 
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6To derive solutions, we will use the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium, computing the solutions for each 
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Price Competition 
To solve the game, consider first the demand faced by the high-quality and low-quality firm, 
respectively. Let h and o stand for high and low quality, respectively. These demands are then 
given by:
7 
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Let i = h, o; let j ≠ i. The profit function for firm i is given by Πi = piqi(pi,pj,si,sj) - ci(si). 
Taken both qualities as given, the price reaction functions in each market are given as the 
solutions to the first order conditions. Solving the resulting equations for both prices, 
equilibrium prices are then given as: 
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Note that for all sh > so, T > th > to > 0 will hold, i.e., equation (4) is in fact an unconstrained 
price equilibrium. 
Given the price equilibrium depicted above, demands and thus profits can be expressed in 
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Similarly, consumer surplus
8 can be expressed in the following way: 
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Quality Competition 
To derive the firms' quality best responses, we investigate each firm's profit function, given 
the other firm's quality choice, and taking into account the behavior in the price-setting 
subgame. Given the order of qualities, the profit functions in equations (5) are concave in the 
respective firm´s own quality. The profit-maximizing choices form a Nash-equilibrium in 
qualities, where both marginal profit functions evaluate to zero. The first order conditions for 
the high and low quality firm, respectively, are then given as: 
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  From the properties of the revenue functions and the slopes of the quality best responses 
depicted in the Appendix, it is easy to see that the two qualities are strategic complements. 
Furthermore, a forced increase of the low quality will reduce product differentiation and 
increase price competition.  
The resulting equilibrium qualities for identical firms (i.e. bh = bo = b) are then:
9 
sh = 0.126655 T2 / b and so = 0.0241192 T2 / b 
However, for our example, we assume the low-quality producing home firm to have a cost 
advantage such that bh = 1.5 bo = 1.5 b.
10 Hence, the resulting equilibrium is
11 
 s h = 0.08533 T2 / b and so = 0.02133 T2 / b  (8) 
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Due to the foreign high-quality firm’s cost disadvantage, its quality is now substantially lower 
than in the symmetric case. Therefore, the home firm’s quality is lower, too. However, since 
the home firm has a cost advantage, quality differentiation is lower. 
The resulting domestic Welfare and Profit are: 
 W d = 0.00978 T4 / b and Πo = 0.00068 T4 / b  (9) 
To keep the following example simple, we assume that both firms have to incur costs of 
providing quality per period, i.e. the quality chosen in the period before does not matter. 
 
3. A Quality Standard Facilitating Predation 
In this section, we will develop a case where the domestic government can increase welfare as 
well as domestic profits by an appropriately chosen standard which will induce the domestic 
firm to choose a quality higher than its initial quality and the formerly chosen foreign quality 
while the foreign firm is induced to exit the market. Hence, this is a case of policy-induced 
predation. 
The domestic government chooses a standard such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
1) The domestic firm cannot make positive profits as the low-quality firm. 
2) The domestic firm can choose a quality such that the foreign firm cannot have positive 
profits as either the low-quality firm or the high-quality firm. 
3) Domestic welfare and profits are increased. 
Condition 1) requires a standard greater than or equal to the quality level at which the 
domestic low-cost firm makes zero profits given that the foreign high-cost firm provides high 
quality at its quality best response. This requires that the standard sm be set such that sm ≥ 
0.04275 T2/b. (All calculations are shown in the Appendix.) 
Given such a standard, entry by the foreign firm is effectively blockaded. This means that the 
domestic firm can set its uncontested monopoly choice sd = 0.125 T2/b at which Condition 2)    8 
is satisfied. This is verified by calculating the foreign firm’s best response profits as the low-
cost firm and the high-cost firm, respectively, setting the other quality equal to 0.125 T2/b. 
Both calculations yield negative results. 
Condition 3) is also satisfied as can be seen by calculating domestic welfare and profits given 
sd = 0.125 T2/b and sf = 0. The result is summarized below. 
 s m = 0.04275 T2/b, sd = 0.125 T2/b, Wd = 0.03125 T4/b and Πd = 0.015625 T4/b (10) 
Since welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and profits, we can see immediately that 
domestic consumer surplus rises.
12 Since the foreign firm cannot make profits, the foreign 
country as a whole is worse off. This means that the policy includes international profit-
shifting and can therefore be qualified as strategic trade policy. 
 
5. Foreign Domination Instead of Domestic Predation 
If the domestic firm has a cost advantage, a quality standard that is set “too low”, i.e. too close 
to the low-quality level without regulation, may lead to a situation where the foreign firm can 
only survive as the high-quality supplier in the market. Given enough time and without a 
persistence of quality leadership, this could lead to a quality reversal where the domestic 
industry is not driven out of the market, but ends up as the low-quality supplier despite of its 
cost advantage. 
Let the home cost advantage be again such that bo = 1.5 bh = 1.5 b. Be minimum quality 
standard greater than or equal to 0.0349322 T2/b, but not much greater than that, will remove 
the foreign firm’s ability to make profits as a low-quality supplier.
13 Consequently, only one 
Nash-equilibrium remains once the one-shot market game is played again. This will be the 
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13 The critical value for the standard is calculated by simultaneously solving the first-order condition for the 
high-quality firm with bh=b and the zero-profit condition for the low-quality firm with bo=1.5 b for sh and so.    9 
one with the foreign firm providing high  quality despite, or here because, of its cost 
disadvantage. 
 
5. When the  Standard Invites Foreign Predation 
If the foreign firm has the cost advantage rather than the domestic firm, then the domestic 
standard would lead to predation by the foreign firm and exit of the domestic firm. This 
follows immediately by analogy from the arguments presented in the previous section. Note, 
though,  that domestic welfare would still rise since the increase in consumer surplus would be 
higher than losing the domestic firm’s low-quality profits. 
To illustrate this, assume for simplicity (and without much loss of generality) that the foreign 
firm has an advantage such that bh = 1.5 bo = 1.5 b. Note that again, the domestic firm 
provides low quality. Now the same minimum quality standards enables the foreign firm to 
set monopoly quality while the domestic firm’s best response is to exit. The resulting situation 
is summarized as: 
 s m = 0.04275 T2/b, sf = 0.125 T2/b, Wd = CSd = 0.015625 T4/b and Πd = sd = 0  (11) 




The purpose of the case shown above is to illustrate that domestic policies such as standards 
might have strategic trade effects that are not marginal but entail a complete restructuring of 
the international market in question. In the case presented, a standard that was nonbinding for 
the foreign firm ultimately lead to the exit of the foreign firm. This standard also enabled the 
domestic firm to act exactly like a monopolist without the threat of further entry. In doing this, 
the domestic firm chose a quality that was not bound by the standard, higher than the quality it    10 
would have chosen without a standard, and higher than the quality the foreign firm would 
have chosen without the standard. 
However, we do not generally argue for the application of such policies, even if they lead to 
welfare increases for the domestic country. On the contrary, policy makers should simply be 
aware of the possibility of rather radical and detrimental effects of domestic policies. The 
possibility of predation arises generally when a policy leads to negative profits for some 
subset of an industry’s best response choices. In addition, the final effects of such a policy and 
the resulting predation are rather sensitive to the exact standard chosen as well as to the 
magnitude and direction of cost differences between competing industries.  
 
Appendix 
(All calculations are available upon request.) 
Properties of the Revenue Functions 
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Slopes of Firms' Quality Best Responses 
The slopes of the high and low quality firms' quality best responses can be calculated (using 
the implicit function theorem) as dsi/dsj = -(∂(∂Πi/∂si)/∂sj)/(∂(∂Πi/∂si)/∂si), where i is either 
high or low quality and j is the other quality. Both slopes are positive, but less than one. 
    11 
Properties of the Consumer Surplus Functions 
Let CSI (I = D, F) denote region I's consumer surplus function. Firms' qualities are denoted by 















































Calculation Procedure for the Quality Equilibria in Section 2 












For a=1 ( i.e. bh = bo = b) r = 5.25123 while for a=2/3 ( i.e. bh = 1.5 bo = 1.5 b) r = 4.0. Using 
r to express sh in terms of so and substituting for sh in the first equation of (7) allows for 
calculating the equilibrium qualities for any given value of T and b. (However, the ratio of 
cost parameters a must be fixed.) 
 
Calculations for the Case of Section 3 
Calculation of a standard such that the domestic firm makes zero-profits as low-quality 
provider. The standard would bind the domestic firm. Take equations (5a) and (5b) with (bh = 
1.5 b, bo = b). Solve simultaneously: 
 { ∂Πh/∂sh = 0 and Pio = 0} to obtain {sh = 0.091728 T2/b, so = 0.0427526 T2/b} 
In this solution, so represents the binding standard on the domestic firm. 
Calculation of the uncontested monopoly choice of the domestic firm. Take equation (5a) with 
(bh = 1, so = 0). Solve: 
  ∂Πh/∂sh = 0 to obtain sh = 0.125 T2/b 
Here, sh is the uncontested monopoly choice of the domestic firm.    12 
Given the domestic firm’s quality choice in equation (A.5b), the calculations below show that 
the foreign firm cannot make positive profits. 
Take equation (5a) with (bh = 1.5 b). Solve simultaneously: 
 { ∂Πh/∂sh = 0 and Pih = 0} to obtain {sh = 0.0972222 T2/b, so = 0.0555556 T2/b} 
In this solution, so represents the minimum domestic quality such that the foreign firm cannot 
make positive profits as the high-quality provider. This quality is less than the chosen 
domestic quality of 0.125 T2/b. 
Take equation (5b) with (bo = 1.5 b, sh = 0.125 T2/b). Solve: 
  Πo = 0 to obtain so = 0.034746 T2/b 
This solution represents the maximum foreign quality such that the foreign firm can make 
nonnegative profits as the low-quality provider. It is less than the standard of 0.0427526 T2/b. 
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